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	 absTraCT
	 The	bumpy	road	from	Paris	to	Brussels:
	 The European Commission governance incentive tranche
The EC recently launched a new aid instrument for the ACP-community: the “gov-
ernance incentive tranche”, a modality designed to incentivise ACP-governments to carry out 
governance reforms. In this paper we analyse whether this new initiative incorporates the prin-
ciples spurred by the aid effectiveness debate and adopted by the Paris declaration (2005). Evi-
dence suggests that in design and practice, the incentive tranche is surprisingly similar to some 
of the unsuccessful aid modalities of the past. The paper argues that in order to fully grasp the 
complexity of donor behaviour, the donor’s domestic issues and political arrangements have to 
be brought into the analysis. The incentive tranche illustrates how the complexity of the Euro-
pean construction makes formulation of a coherent policy exceptionally difficult. 
	 résumé
	 La	route	cahoteuse	de	Paris	à	Bruxelles	:
	 La tranche incitative de la Commission européenne
Récemment la CE a lancé un nouvel instrument d’aide aux pays ACP: la tranche 
incitative pour la bonne gouvernance, une modalité conçue pour encourager les gouvernements 
ACP à réaliser des réformes de gouvernance. Dans cet article nous analysons si cette nouvelle 
initiative incorpore les principes produits par le débat sur l’efficacité de l’aide et adoptés par 
la déclaration de Paris (2005). Nous constatons qu’en intention et en pratique, la tranche est 
étonnamment semblable à certaines modalités d’aide qui se sont révélées infructueuses. Pour 
expliquer et saisir pleinement le comportement ambigu du bailleur, il est nécessaire de tenir 
compte des dynamiques et arrangements politiques et institutionnelles du bailleur même. La 
tranche incitative illustre comment la complexité de la construction européenne rend la formu-
lation d’une politique cohérente extrêmement difficile.
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1.	 InTroduCTIon
In the August 2006 Communication “Governance in the European Consensus on 
Development” the European Commission (EC) unveiled its new “governance incentive tranche“ 
(ECGIT) for ACP countries. The ECGIT consists of supplementary funding to states who cred-
ibly commit themselves to satisfactory governance reforms. The instrument is part of the 10th 
European Development Fund (EDF), which finances the European Community’s development 
cooperation with the ACP community from 2008 to 2013. About one twelfth of the EDF budget 
is set aside for the governance initiative, which means that around € 2.7 billion will be allocated 
as a “governance incentive” to countries who schedule governance reforms.[1] 
The design and introduction of such a new instrument merits attention, as late-
ly foreign aid has become heavily debated. Over the past decade donors have come to realise 
that their way of delivering aid has generated many counterproductive outcomes in developing 
countries and it is now understood that aid has to live up to certain criteria if it is expected to 
strengthen partner countries’ government systems and spur their economic growth. Aid effec-
tiveness is currently a hot topic and donors and aid recipients have resolved to jointly tackle the 
issue at several high level meetings.[2] The Paris Declaration (PD), the widely endorsed centre-
piece of the aid effectiveness strategy, engages all involved parties to live up to five monitorable 
aid effectiveness criteria: ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results-orientedness and mu-
tual accountability. In the light of the discussion of the aid effectiveness level of the ECGIT, it is 
useful to elaborate on the specific content of these principles. 
•  Ownership: partner countries commit themselves to development goals and strategies and  
  aim to take the leadership in coordination of aid flows and activities
•  Alignment: recipients’ policies and country systems form the basis of donor support
•  Harmonisation: donors divide labour, share information, establish common procedures and  
  simplify reporting 
•  Managing for results: aid management and implementation is rooted in a results-oriented  
  approach driven by information-sharing and indicators
•  Mutual accountability: both donors and recipients are responsible for the transparent use  
  of resources for development; both partners assess their progress on the implementation of  
  the PD.
Twelve indicators are used to measure progress on these criteria and targets are 
set for 2010. Donors[3] have enthusiastically endorsed the new principles and have committed 
themselves to reform their aid accordingly and the EC has profiled itself as one of the more vocal 
actors on this issue. It actually played an important role during the consultations leading up to 
the PD (OECD/DAC 2007a) and even self-imposed more ambitious goals on four of the indica-
tors agreed at the High Level Forum.[4] 
[1]   The whole EDF amounts to €22.6 billion (EC 2006).
[2]   High Level Forum on Harmonisation in Rome (2003), the Marrakech roundtable on Managing for Develop-
ment Results (2004), the Paris High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Third High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness (2008).
[3]   With the exception of the US and Japan, who command large aid budgets but have not been so eager to com-
mit themselves to the approach. 
[4]   These additional pledges are: ensure all technical cooperation is delivered through coordinated programmes 
and increasingly in cooperation with other donors; direct half of its aid through country systems and increasingly do 
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Unfortunately, in spite of widespread donor acceptance of the necessity of aid re-
form and despite the legitimacy of the PD criteria, the real implementation of these promises 
has been rather meagre (Booth 2008, Easterly & Pfutze 2008, Jain 2007). Recent EC policy 
documents also point to the gap between what donors are promising and what they are actually 
putting into effect (EC 2008a, EC 2008b). We argue nonetheless that the ECGIT does not es-
cape this trap either. This specific example makes us wonder why donors on the one hand agree 
with the aid effectiveness “recipe” and on the other hand go on implementing what they know 
to be suboptimal development policies.
In the next part we take a closer look at the design of the ECGIT. Afterwards some 
weak points of the ECGIT in the light of the aid effectiveness criteria are singled out and we try 
to offer some explanations, mainly relating to intra-donor political and institutional incentives, 
as to why it does not represent an application of the principles the European Community and the 
other European donors so enthusiastically proclaim. These findings are based on a desk study 
of European policy documents and interviews with Commission officials and some bilateral do-
nors.
this through using budget support and SWAP’s; preclude the installation of new EC Project Implementation Units 
and halve the number of un-coordinated donor missions (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU 2006).
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2.	 The	seT-up	of	The	eCGIT	
The  ECGIT process starts with the drawing up of the partner country’s governance 
profile by the EC. The profile is divided into nine sections[5] of which the first six ones corre-
spond to the governance indicators developed by the World Bank. For these first parts the World 
Bank indicators for the period 1996-2004 are used as benchmarks to evaluate the governance 
trend. The local EC delegation[6] then produces its own assessment for the period 2005-2006 
for all nine sections. All governance profiles are checked on their comparability in headquarters 
in Brussels, after which they are sent back to the EC field missions, where the weaknesses identi-
fied in the assessments are prioritized. 
After the governance profile has been fully assessed and the most significant weak-
nesses have been singled out by the EC, the dialogue with the partner country begins. The EC 
delegation encourages the government to propose reforms that adequately tackle the identified 
governance concerns. If the government accepts to do this, it is expected to put forward an ac-
tion plan that lists all planned measures, which preferably derive from other reform plans (e.g. 
the PRSP). These action plans are then sent to Brussels for assessment on three criteria:
•  relevance: matching of the weaknesses recognized in the governance profile by pertinent
  reforms 
•  ambition: level to which weaknesses are dealt with, refers to political will
•  credibility: result-oriented indicators and realistic timelines guide the reform plan, refers  
  to capacity for carrying out the action plan. Previous performance and latest governance  
  trends can possibly also be taken into account for this criterion.
Although the evaluation is meant to be qualitative, comparability demands that 
each criterion is given a score (basic =≤1, intermediate = >1 to 1.49, high = 1.5 to 2.49, very high = 
2.5 to 3) which leads to differentiation between four tranches:
•  initial level (10 %): basic or intermediate score on all three criteria
•  second level (20 %): one or two criteria given a basic or intermediate assessment,
  at least one high score
•  third level (25 %): high or very high score on all three criteria
•  fourth level (30%): all criteria assessed as very high 
An additional 5% is added for countries that have concluded the African Peer Re-
view Mechanism. The six Portuguese-speaking African countries that agreed to supplementary 
commitments in the cooperation with the EC in the domain of governance also receive up to 
5% extra. Furthermore, the special situation of fragile states is taken into account during the 
assessment as a corrective factor, although according to several sources they also receive a 5% 
bonus.
After this evaluation and the mutual comparison of the action plans by the EC geo-
graphical desks they are sent back to the field where they are discussed by the EC and Mem-
[5]   Political/democratic governance, political governance/rule of law, control of corruption, government effec-
tiveness, economic governance, internal and external security, social governance, international and regional con-
text and quality of partnership (European Commission Interservice Quality Support Group 2006).
[6]   With local EC delegation we mean the field delegation in the ACP country itself. 
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ber State delegations. Ultimately the action plans are attached to the Country Strategy Papers 
(CSPs) which must be approved by the EDF committee.[7] The tranche is allocated and disbursed 
as a “top-up” to the initial country allocations and it is added to the funding for the interventions 
identified in the National Indicative Programmes. These interventions can be oriented towards 
any sector, including governance. The funds allocated through the ECGIT are however not spe-
cifically reserved for governance interventions. 
No decisions have been made on the exact methodology for monitoring the im-
plementation of the action plans or the precise way performance in implementation will affect 
the country allocations. The Communication only states that actual implementation of com-
mitments would be assessed on the ground and taken into account for the mid-term and end-
of-term reviews, and that allocations could be enlarged annually in the case of exceptional ac-
complishments. In all probability follow-up on governance commitments will become one of the 
performance criteria of the 10th EDF (alongside sectoral, financial and macro-economic per-
formance) and this factor will affect the general country allocation, not only the tranche itself. 
As of September 2008, ECGIT allocations for most countries had been decided. 
Only 17 partner countries had not been assigned a tranche level: for nine countries the assess-
ment process was ongoing, one country had decided not to put forward an action plan and for 
the remaining seven countries the programming process had been delayed.[8] 
[7]   These Country and Regional Strategy Papers are the end-results of the EDF programming process. They lay 
out the foundations of the cooperation between the partner countries and the EC. The EDF is funded directly by the 
Member States and is not a part of the EC budget. All decisions about the use of the EDF fund must go through the 
EDF committee, comprised of representatives from the Member States (EC 2008c). The EDF committee decides 
with weighted voting (votes per country based on size of contribution to the EDF) on the CSPs.
[8]   Situation as presented at the Workshop on Governance in the 10th EDF for ACP countries, Brussels, 30-09-
2008. These countries are Eritrea, Fiji, Nigeria, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Somalia. The Bahamas chose not 
to submit an action plan. 
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3.	 evaluaTIon	of	The	eCGIT:	old-sTyle	CondITIonalITy?	[9]	
The EC is adamant about presenting the tranche as an “incentive”, a “dialogue”-
based approach and therefore an aid allocation method significantly distinct from other, more 
traditional, conditionality-based ways[10] of distributing resources. For the optimistic (and may-
be even a bit gullible) the Commission’s reasoning does indeed represent a hope-giving story: 
better governance benefits everyone, so all governments will surely draw up an ambitious, yet 
feasible action plan and enthusiastically implement it. If this reasoning were true to reality, then 
a tricky question comes to mind : why is this financial “incentive” even needed?
The answer to this question lies in the reason why aid agencies exist: they mediate 
between the preferences of the donor and those of the recipient which are only seldom (if ever) 
fully convergent. If donors and recipients would fully agree on everything then there would be 
no need for dialogue or negotiation, hence a blank check would suffice (Martens 2005: 644). Aid 
money is thus used to bargain and persuade governments to take actions in line with donor in-
tentions. Stokke (1995) distinguishes ex-post conditionality (the actions are to be accomplished 
before the aid is delivered) from ex-ante conditionality (aid delivery is granted based on recipient 
promises for future actions). Digging a bit deeper into the implementation of the ECGIT reveals 
that it fits the description of ex-ante conditionality suspiciously well.
The action plan which recipients are expected to draw up,  takes shape through a 
“dialogue [that] is intended to encourage the government to commit itself to taking the measures 
necessary to remedy the weaknesses identified” (EC 2006: 169). In other words, the EC tries to 
convince the partner country to list up reforms that fit the priority issues identified in the gov-
ernance assessment made by the EC. If the government accepts the EC’s advice, which means 
promising reforms in the areas the EC deems most important, it receives access to a higher 
tranche (cf. the assessment criteria relevance “matching the weaknesses identified by the EC in 
the governance profile” and ambition “level to which the weaknesses are dealt with”). The pic-
ture is quite clear: the EC asks countries to propose reforms on certain issues, or even requests 
specific measures (as does happen in practice sometimes). If a country agrees to do this, it will 
get more aid than if it does not. 
However, while recipients often do not take issue with the assessment of their gov-
ernance presented in the governance profile, practice shows that they react less meekly when 
the EC confronts them with its requests for reform. “Partners often accept the diagnosis, but are 
less happy about the medicine” is how one of our interviewees put it. This less than enthusias-
tic reaction by recipients illustrates that not every country would have placed the governance 
reforms now present in their action plans on the agenda, were it not for the reward attached. 
This pressure to underwrite donors’ wishes is especially high for low income and aid-dependent 
countries.
[9]   For some critiques voiced by civil society on the set-up of the ECGIT, see AfriMAP 2007, BOND 2006, Ceup-
pens 2006, CIDSE 2006 and Stocker 2007.
[10]   It became clear during the interviews that the Commission does not want the ECGIT to be even remotely as-
sociated with the word “conditionality”.
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So, staying far away from conditionality concepts, while embracing the ideas of dia-
logue, partnership and ownership in discourse, does not necessarily imply that the actual proc-
esses on the ground respond to these lofty principles. The ECGIT’s substantive content does in 
fact seem to be based on ex-ante conditionality and unfortunately this traditional way of impos-
ing conditions does not work very well. 
3.1	 Recipients’	lack	of	incentives	to	reform	
Lack of ownership on the recipient side is one important cause of incompliance with 
externally imposed conditions, especially if these are not in touch with a local reform drive (Col-
lier et al. 1997, Stokke 1995). Diverging interests between donor and recipient exemplify a typi-
cal principal-agent problem (Killick 1997).[11] And when the benefits have been gained ex-ante, 
the recipient’s (agent) incentive to comply is very low. 
Among the ACP states, commitment to governance reform surely differs widely. In 
several countries an endogenous process of political reform has been set in motion and some 
countries’ governance action plans probably reflect already internally planned reforms. For 
these countries the tranche might function less as a conditionality and serve as a valuable extra 
resource for the implementation of their national developmental strategies, of which the CSP is 
hopefully a part. But to assume this for the bulk of ACP countries might be somewhat naïve. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa there are a number of neo-patrimonial states where an absence of political 
will to reform has characterised  donor-recipient relations for the past decades. These states 
function according to a certain political logic where patronage, clientelism and rent-seeking op-
erate as the main power-enforcing techniques. Hence, governance reform can be a less than 
enticing, even menacing, prospect for these regimes (Cammack 2007).
Indeed, the people we interviewed at the EC admitted that the tranche couldn’t 
motivate a great deal of countries and that this led to a meagre effort being put into some of 
the action plans. This lukewarm reaction gives a clear indication of the level of ownership of the 
partner countries. Another reason put forward by the interviewees to explain this weak interest 
was that for some states the stakes were not very high. This is because there is only a 5 or 10% 
differentiation between the different tranches, hence big differences in quality between action 
plans cannot be translated into equivalent divergences in resource allocations. This lack of vari-
ation is also shown in the final allocation of the available funds:  the large majority of countries 
ended up in the middle tranche (25%).[12] 
The low motivation and weak interest exhibited by a score of countries are reflected 
in the poor quality of a number of the action plans. Some of them are utterly vague in express-
ing goals like “structuring an open dialogue with the political opposition and civil society on 
the strengthening of the democratic system” (République du Tchad – Communauté européenne 
2007 : 21) or “strengthening the State in its regulatory role in order to guarantee a better part-
nership between public and private sectors, especially in the social sectors” (République du 
Bénin – Communauté européenne 2007 : 136) without including measurable performance indi-
[11]   Principal agent theory describes the interaction between two parties with divergent interests, where one 
party needs cooperation from the other to attain its own objectives.
[12]   The intermediary score is as follows: 3 countries at 10%, 11 countries at 20%, 41 countries at 25% , 5 countries 
at 30%.
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cators. These reform plans do not seem to indicate a serious government commitment to reform, 
nor do they provide a good foundation for grounding the governance initiative in a monitorable 
results-oriented framework. 
When we take a close look at the assessment methodology for the governance ac-
tion plans, it becomes clear that it is nevertheless impossible for a country not to get access 
to the tranche. A nil score on each criterion leads to three qualitative ratings of “basic” which 
results in the allocation of a 10% tranche. Uninterested as a country may be in reform, it will 
receive extra aid if it submits any kind of governance action plan. Assuming that not all 69 ACP-
countries that submitted a reform plan currently have a committed developmental regime in 
place, we can reasonably argue that part of the € 2.7 billion reserved for the ECGIT will flow to 
states where these funds will probably not be put to effective use. And in many cases extra fund-
ing can actually serve to prop up non-developmental regimes (Bräutigam 2000, Knack 2000, 
De Haan & Everest-Phillips 2007).
On a positive note, some of these reform proposals do strongly draw on other ac-
tion programs such as the PRSP, sector strategic plans or APRM plans of action and are based 
on achieving certain concretely defined performance goals. In the worst case however these na-
tional development strategies are also donor-driven and the chances of implementation remain 
meagre.  In general, too many of the action plans display an unreasonably long and diverse list 
of desirable reforms, which makes it seem implausible that states with limited capacity will be 
able to implement them – and this plausibility further diminishes when we take into account 
that they very often get similar “reform wish lists” from the World Bank and other donors.[13]
In short, the concept of the action plans does not seem to be designed to be locally 
owned. For some countries, this means that chances are that governance reforms will not be 
sufficiently implemented and that extra aid will possibly continue funding the workings of an 
ineffective regime. Unfortunately, weak commitment on the part of the recipient has generally 
been overly tolerated by donors, which exacerbates incompliance problems.
3.2.	 The	importance	of	a	strong	monitoring	and	evaluation	(M&E)	system
Lack  of  recipient  commitment  can  be  mediated  if  strong  and  clear  monitoring 
schemes linked to disbursement decisions are installed so as to track progress. The importance 
of M&E for any intervention is well explained and documented, hence it hardly needs any expla-
nation here. Given the fact that the action plan serves as a basis for allocating resources, one 
would expect that the EC would have thought out a monitoring system or a methodology to 
track progress, and some guidelines on how progress (or lack thereof) affects future disburse-
ments. Establishing such a scheme and communicating or discussing its implications is not just 
functional for aid effectiveness’ sake in terms of results-orientedness, it is just as much about 
respecting the mutual accountability principle as stipulated in the PD. Systems of mutual ac-
countability heavily draw on the idea of transparency and predictable behaviour on both donor 
and recipient sides. In this case, the introduction of a new instrument raises all kinds of ques-
[13]   The EC’s negotiations with the ACP countries in the realm of trade liberalisation seem to suffer from the same 
weaknesses.  Countries are expected to step up their regulatory framework and institutions in order to benefit from 
the implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreements, but the EC does not sufficiently factor in how long 
and difficult the road to reform will be when a large part of the partner countries do not possess sufficient political 
will or capacity to thoroughly change their institutions (Borrmann & Busse 2007, Szepesi 2004).
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tions on follow-up and implications on aid disbursements. To which extent has the EC respected 
some of these principles in the design of the ECGIT and its M&E? 
When going through all the EC documents on the GIT, little to nothing can be found 
on M&E. Our interviewees however stated that monitoring governance progress will be the cru-
cial test for the ECGIT. They also expressed the hope that the EC and the Member States will 
gather sufficient political courage to cut the allocations of partners who have not shown enough 
progress in the implementation of their action plans. Unfortunately the EC did not prepare in 
detail how this monitoring will take place. There is no exact methodology for monitoring the 
implementation of the action plans nor is there a lot of clarity yet on how it will have an effect 
on the country allocations. Even if a clear monitoring policy existed, it is not very plausible that 
the EC would be brave in cutting aid, as they already avoided “risky” decisions during an earlier 
phase by allocating almost all tranches around the middle value. Furthermore, no specific fund-
ing is foreseen for the implementation of the action plans. As stated earlier, the funds from the 
governance tranche flow directly to the focal sectors identified in the CSP. This also raises doubt 
about the feasibility of a successful implementation of the action plans and points to a lack of 
focus on results. 
In conclusion, under ex-ante conditionality, low ownership drives partner countries 
to handle aid funds in a way that is not sufficiently geared towards the attainment of devel-
opment results. The EC has not succeeded in avoiding this long-established pitfall of ex-ante 
conditionality, and it does not seem able yet to correct the flawed set-up of the ECGIT through a 
well-established monitoring set-up. 
To sum up, it is rather strange that the Commission, though formally committed, 
did not implement the new aid principles through an application of elements of ex-post condi-
tionality or selectivity, since these try to combine results-orientedness with ownership. The new 
aid approach prescribes that governments and donors ideally negotiate aid and reforms through 
a policy dialogue where they mutually agree on the actions and targets to be set out. Monitor-
ing, evaluation and disbursement consequences are to be spelled out explicitly so as to ensure 
predictability and mutual accountability. The agreements are reflected in a contract owned by 
both partners. Aid selectivity on the other hand aims at rewarding good performers. If countries 
are producing satisfactory results they become eligible for more and more flexible forms of aid. 
Evidently, this selective strategy brings with it the danger of creating “aid orphans”. However, 
given the fact that these countries are also the ones that need more aid, donors do supply assist-
ance but often using somewhat less flexible modalities than budget support, while more donor-
steering takes place in the programme approaches in these states (Radelet 2005). In theory this 
focus on result-orientedness creates incentives for recipients to step up their reform processes. 
With the creation of the ECGIT, the EC has thus bypassed the new aid principles. 
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4.		 Why	do	donors,	Who	should	knoW	beTTer,
	 desIGn	ImperfeCT	polICIes?
A closer look at the ECGIT thus reveals that it is quite uncertain that it will foster 
real governance reforms in ACP states, and this is partly due to the fact that, in this particular 
case, the EC hasn’t capitalized on the lessons learned. From a purely developmental perspective, 
it is puzzling that donors would forsake the possibility of gaining more developmental returns 
from each aid Euro spent. Development effectiveness is however just one relevant objective. Do-
nors are political actors that try to balance many objectives and pressures. Development con-
cerns are not the only reason for giving aid. Diplomatic, commercial or cultural motivations can 
be of equal, or even greater importance (Lancaster 2007). The extent to which development 
policy is shaped by these respective motives is determined by the same factors that guide politi-
cal decisions in other areas: the institutions and the various preferences of the actors involved in 
them (Hinich & Munger 1997:17 in Hix 2005: 13). Aid effectiveness therefore very much hinges 
on the incentives and structures of donors  (Faust & Messner 2007) .
When analysing European policy, one has to take the very particular institutional 
structure into account that simultaneously empowers and limits the EU’s scope for action. Eu-
ropean Community development policy towards the ACP is financed by the EDF, which is funded 
directly by Member States’ contributions and is not a part of the Community budget. As men-
tioned earlier, the management of the EDF fund, which encompasses decisions concerning the 
ECGIT, is carried out by the EDF committee, comprised of representatives from the Member 
States (EC 2008c) who decide by qualified majority voting (QMV).[14] Mostly however, decision 
making is consensual and the result of negotiations. This mix of intergovernmentalism (EDF) and 
supranationalism (EC) in the decision-making processes naturally holds certain implications for 
the design and content of policies. 
Moravscik’s (1993) theory of liberal intergovernmentalism highlights the central 
role domestic contexts and interstate bargaining play in the European integration process and 
how these processes often lead to a “lowest common denominator” outcome. Policies come 
into being in two bargaining stages: one policy discussion takes place within the Member States, 
the other one has the Member States and the European institutions sitting at the negotiation ta-
ble. European development policy making could thus be regarded as a two-level game (Putnam 
1988) where national leaders must succeed in supplying to the domestic needs voiced at the 
first level, while sufficiently taking into account the wider European interest at the second level. 
This model specifies three types of interests that must be taken into account: national interests 
(Member States), specifically “European” interests (shared by the European institutions and 
Member States), and the bureaucratic interests of European institutions (Olsen 2005). Many 
aspects of the ECGIT can be explained by taking into account the way these divergent interests 
are accommodated in the search for a common policy. In the following we focus respectively on 
how European, national and bureaucratic interests, and the institutions that serve to channel 
them shape the EC’s behaviour and decisions. 
[14]   For more information about the voting procedures, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/
l_247/l_24720060909en00320045.pdf (last consulted 16-05-2008) .
The bumpy road from paris To brussels1 • IOB Discussion PaPer 2008-08
4.1.	 The	“transcending”	European	interest
Europe has a great interest in acquiring a strong international presence,[15] exem-
plified in the constant push for the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
but also in the creation of the post of “Mr. Europe”, the new High Representative, in the Lisbon 
treaty. Developing a broader and stronger international identity and sphere for action can be 
related to the advance of several specific “European” interests and values that transcend and 
connect those of the different Member States. Various interlinked material and ideal interests 
come into play, among others European concerns about immigration, terrorism and security and 
genuine belief in the ideals of democracy and human rights (Holland 2002). 
Development policy is one way the EU has tried to assert its growing identity on 
the global scene and its international influence (Petiteville 2003, Holland 2002, Olsen 2004). 
Many observers point to a growing linkage between development and foreign policy within the 
EU, inter alia mentioning the transfer of the competence for development from the Development 
Council to the Council for General Affairs and External Relations in 2002 (Open Europe 2007, 
Eberlei & Auclair 2007, ECDPM & ActionAid 2008, Woods 2005, Olsen 2007, Orbie & Vers-
luys 2008). The European Security Strategy of 2003 explicitly includes development policy in 
its range of tools[16], citing “[s]ecurity as the first condition for development” (European Coun-
cil 2003: 13). The heavily mediated public declarations[17] about Europe’s huge aid budget and 
widespread presence in the world adds weight to the perception that the EU considers develop-
ment policy to be a significant symbolic component of its authority as a global political entity. 
ACP cooperation specifically functions as a symbol of the “commitment to the de-
veloping world” that characterises Europe’s vision of its global role (Arts & Dickson 2004). Af-
rica was the first region targeted by the Community’s external action and EU-Africa relations 
have now evolved into one of the foundations on which the EU is seeking to construct its interna-
tional role (Lister 1997). A policy focus on democratization and human rights in Africa emerged 
after the Cold War, while security gained more importance after 9/11. This also means that aid 
to Africa has taken on another, more political and security-related role and is being increasingly 
used as an instrument of the CFSP (Olsen 2004, Olsen 2007).[18] In sum, the EU-Africa partner-
ship has a strong emblematic value as one of Europe’s most longstanding external action areas 
and this partnership has increasingly become security- and foreign policy-oriented. One impor-
tant initiative in this respect is the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership which is a political partner-
ship based around eight themes, including security, governance, trade and migration (EC 2007). 
Maintaining strong EU-Africa relations can thus be considered as another relevant European 
interest. 
[15]   The most important and authoritative policy document that expresses this interest is the Maastricht treaty. 
European Union, Treaty on European Union (1992) Official Journal C 191 of 29 July 1992, Brussels, art. B: “The Un-
ion shall set itself the following objectives: […]  to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through 
the implementation of a common foreign and security policy“
[16]   “The challenge now is to bring together different instruments […] [including] the European Development 
Fund” (European Council 2003: 13).  
[17]   For example, the establishment of the European Community Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) in 1992 is 
regarded as an attempt to guarantee the EC more visibility in a highly mediatised activity, i.e. emergency aid deliv-
ery (Olsen 2004).
[18]   Exemplified by the use of €250 million from the EDF for the African Peace Facility (Woods 2005, Olsen 
2007).
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How is this related to the ECGIT? As mentioned before, aid can have a diplomat-
ic function by serving towards the attainment of international political goals and for example 
providing access to highly placed officials in receiving countries (Lancaster 2007).[19] Lebovic’s 
(2005) analysis of bilateral aid allocations reveals that donors take into account their relative 
position to other donors when deciding on aid allocations. Partner countries often receive a 
substantial aid “bonus” from donors who want to benefit from the visibility and the relative 
influence which is linked to primary donor status. Other research confirms that heightening aid 
allocations serves donor interests in maintaining close relations with recipient countries.[20] 
Although many commentators observe a growing European disinterest in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa, reflected in decreasing aid budgets (Olsen 2005, Smith 2004), the EC consistently 
points out the central place Africa occupies in European development policy and the fundamen-
tal role Europe as a donor plays in African development.[21] Europe‘s ambition to maintain a 
primary position in Africa is reflected in the concerns voiced[22] in relation to the rise of other 
donors, like the United States and China, on the continent (Kingah 2006), a development that 
has resulted in “a race for generosity and altruism between Europe and America” (Santiso 2002: 
406). Big aid budgets are one instrument in this race that allow the EU to present itself as “the 
interlocutor par excellence of countries in the South” (Orbie & Versluys 2008: 77). 
In this sense the actual budget allocated for the ECGIT, which is not so dramati-
cally high in foreign aid terms, is not so relevant as much as its symbolism and the publicity and 
interaction with ACP-countries it entails. The EC representatives we interviewed asserted that 
the ECGIT -even though it is an aid allocation mechanism- is definitely not about the money. 
They insist on letting go of this fixation on “who gets what, when and how”. The value of the gov-
ernance initiative lies in its process and in the message it transmits to partner countries. More 
specifically: the ECGIT is to revive the Article 8 political dialogue of the Cotonou Agreement 
between the European Community and the ACP-countries. This dialogue, a major innovation 
of the Cotonou agreement, is meant to be a very flexible instrument which serves to facilitate 
cooperation, information-sharing and agreement on priorities with regards to all issues of ACP-
EU cooperation including human rights, democracy and good governance (Cotonou convention 
2000: art. 8-9). Unfortunately, implementation of the Article 8 dialogue has not been running 
[19]   One could raise the question if it is fair and useful to evaluate aid effectiveness always and only as develop-
ment effectiveness (Lancaster 2007). Aid that is given for other purposes can be effective in other ways, e.g. estab-
lishing better diplomatic relations. In this case however, we choose to evaluate the EC on the effectiveness of its 
aid defined as development effectiveness because this institution has publicly committed itself to incorporating the 
development/aid effectiveness criteria as the basis of its development policy and also more specifically of its policy 
on governance in development. “ The principles on aid effectiveness approved in March 2005’s Paris Declaration 
and approved by the Council in April 2006 must be fully applied to governance” (EC 2006:157). Furthermore devel-
opment effectiveness can be regarded as a public good where each donor, especially those with huge aid volumes, 
can be held accountable for its contribution. 
[20]   The EC is one of the donors often criticised for letting geographical proximity and domestic interest weigh 
heavily on aid allocations. The top five of EC aid recipients in 2004 included Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey and Mo-
rocco. In general the Human Development Index of EC development partner countries (including non-ACP states) 
is not correlated with the amount of EC aid received per capita (Open Europe 2007). Another study finds that civil 
rights and GDP/capita only slightly influence aid allocations to ACP countries (Wolf & Spoden 2000). The 2007 EC 
DAC Peer Review also stresses the weak poverty focus of the EC’s aid allocation (OECD/DAC 2007b).
[21]   For example: “[t]he Union is already the world’s largest donor in Africa and is the continent’s most important 
economic and trade partner. The European Union thus has a particular role to play and a particular responsibility 
towards the African continent” (EC 2008d)
[22]   The Commission recognises that the arrival of new actors on the African continent, be it for economic, strate-
gic or political reasons, alters the geopolitical environment in which the EU must conceive and put into practice its 
Africa policy (EC 2005).
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very smoothly. Local EC delegations have been unsure of how to initiate and structure this dia-
logue while partner countries have not always been enthusiastic about discussing sensitive po-
litical issues with the EC (O’Connell 2006, Mackie 2003, Hazelhet 2005, Stathopoulos 2003). 
The EC hopes that the negotiations and discussions during the implementation process of the 
ECGIT, linked to the interaction and “contract” the EC enters into with each ACP-state, will get 
the motor of this run-down dialogue running again. 
Although this dialogue could in effect constitute a useful instrument to discuss and 
negotiate ACP-states’ development policies and governance reforms, it also has other purposes 
which might be not as purely development-related. The political dialogue opens up access to 
high-level government officials and space for discussion on issues of more general political and 
diplomatic interest. It could thus serve to bolster the political European action towards the ACP 
states, which would reinforce Europe’s up till now rather weak CFSP. It is also important to point 
out that this separate EC dialogue with partner countries runs counter to the idea of the harmo-
nised policy dialogue. In this way it also increases the possibility that recipients receive mixed 
signals from the donor community.
Furthermore, the design of a methodology that awards all ACP states an extra 
tranche and the EC’s relaxed attitude towards partner countries’ lack of commitment, combined 
with the statements from EC representatives about the strengthening of the political dialogue 
through the ECGIT lead us to suspect that the ECGIT was at least partly designed to consolidate 
the EC’s preferential relationship with the ACP community. It was pointed out earlier that the 
ACP countries react rather lukewarmly to the ECGIT. Remarkably, the EC in turn does not seem 
to be worried by this lack of eagerness from the partner countries: as explained before, even the 
worst action plans get a 10 % tranche. 
The implementation process of the ECGIT - which presupposes ample dialogue be-
tween the EC delegation and the recipient government outside of the harmonised policy dia-
logue – could conceivably be a way for the EC and some of the Member States to assert them-
selves as key interlocutors of the partner country. A reinforced Cotonou political dialogue would 
also carve out a separate forum for the European Community to let its voice be heard. Consist-
ent conditionality seems to have been forsaken by the EC. As a result, withdrawal is not an op-
tion, the EC remains omnipresent and visible as a big donor and international actor, while always 
keeping close contacts with local leaders and safeguarding its ticket to the negotiating table of 
the partner countries. 
4.2.	 Member	States’	interests
Bilateral donors naturally face similar incentives as the EC: aid serves as a multifac-
eted instrument that serves developmental purposes, but also plays a role in states’ foreign pol-
icy. Empirical studies of aid allocation support this statement. The effect of recipient countries’ 
broad level of governance (Neumayer 2003, Hout 2007), democracy, military expenditure and 
human rights record (Carey 2007, Zanger 2000) or corruption (Alesina & Weder 2002, Svensson 
2000) on aid allocation is variable among aid agencies but in general rather weak, although 
the trend has been improving (Dollar & Levin 2004). Other factors and interests predominantly 
come into play when donors assign their aid (Neumayer 2003): recipient need (poverty-oriented 
aid: e.g. GDP/capita, infant mortality) but also strategic “friendships” and colonial ties (Alesina 
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& Dollar 2000). The weight given to more self-interested motives often eclipses the significance 
given to the factors more important for the potential effectiveness of the allocated aid.
Within the European Community, a few Member States with historical interests in 
Africa have always been the driving force of Europe’s preferential ACP policy and it can be argued 
that without the strong lobbying from some Member States, the ACP would not have been able 
to sustain its special status in the European development policy for such a long time (Olsen 
2005). The explanation for this is that Member States often support Community action because 
they hope that a policy on a higher level can complement and reinforce their own external ac-
tions (Smith 2004).
The institutional architecture of European Community-ACP cooperation creates 
this opportunity for Member States and their political interests to weigh in on EC development 
policy. In the EDF committee decisions are taken with QMV and the European Parliament is not 
involved. Bargaining between the Member States, and the Member States and the Commission 
in this context frequently leads to an accommodation of political interests. This type of institu-
tional set-up in effect partly “rebilateralises” EU-ACP relations (Claeys 2004). 
The fact that the European Community as a donor is not a unitary actor thus nar-
rows its policy options, as the weight of individual member states’ interests at times impedes 
the formulation and implementation of a coherent and consistent development policy (Hoe-
bink 2004). It is indeed more difficult for Europe as a donor to differentiate between partner 
countries because it possesses the arduous task of uniting the diverging interests of 27 Member 
States, some of which are big donors with fixed interests in certain states. It is important to keep 
in mind that Member States have to take into account domestic pressures when negotiating on 
policies within the European framework. The intergovernmental nature of aid allocation within 
the Community thus inevitably involves opaque political negotiation and a greater continuity in 
country allocations (Santiso 2002, Santiso 2003, Hout 2007). The 2007 EC DAC Peer review 
(OECD/DAC 2007b) suggests that the rather low poverty focus of EC aid allocation could well 
be at least partially explained by the power Member States have in the decisions concerning 
the EDF budget. This strong influence from the domestic arena means that short-term political 
objectives often prevail (Santiso 2003).
The discussion within the European Community on the methodology of the assess-
ment of the ECGIT action plans is an example that sheds light on this issue. Originally a rather 
technocratic methodology, yet more inclined towards the selectivity idea of the new aid ap-
proach, was proposed: past performance and proposed governance reforms would each count 
for 50% in the assessment, the countries with the weakest action plans would not receive any 
tranche and differentiation between the various tranches would be quite large. This approach 
was abandoned because it was regarded as too “politically sensitive” and “judgmental” and 
the top political level in the DG Development pushed the incentive-based approach in detri-
ment of a focus on scores or performance criteria.[23] The commissioner of the DG Development 
in particular had strong particular preferences regarding the EC’s policy towards Africa and fa-
voured a wider distribution of the tranche resources. According to EC representatives, Member 
States supported this turnaround because it lessens the political friction through guaranteeing 
[23]   Performance criteria are, together with indicators of recipient need, integrated into the aid allocation mecha-
nism of the 10th EDF. This however concerns the initial allocation, which is allocated separately from the ECGIT.
The bumpy road from paris To brussels20 • IOB Discussion PaPer 2008-08
each of their own “long-established” ACP-partners a piece of the cake.[24] Moreover, the EC and 
the Member States also agreed on a smaller differentiation between the tranches, in order to 
avoid possible tensions when allocation decisions would have to be made. As indicated by the 
EC, Member States therefore also reacted very acquiescently when it came to the discussion of 
the actual allocated tranche during the implementation phase and no serious objections were 
made in the EDF committee regarding tranche allocations. One interviewee also suggested that 
some of the Member States with strong ties to the weaker partner countries had been the ones 
to strongly push for the low tranche differentiation and the special treatment for fragile states. 
For one Commission official, the political “hijacking” of the allocation method of the ECGIT was 
a bitter pill to swallow, but he asserted that political meddling into official aid allocation models 
was commonplace.[25] Bargaining and negotiation between the Member States do seem to play 
a bigger part in the process of the ECGIT than the official version of the methodology would sug-
gest. Moreover, during the allocation process of the ECGIT, the space for political manoeuvring 
is even larger than usual as the assessment of the action plans is not very straightforward and 
the results are not publicly communicated. 
In conclusion, constructing a strong and coherent development policy is difficult 
when a donor not only has to take into account interests within its own constituency, but also 
the interests of –in this case 27- other actors, who possess ample institutional space and power 
to contest supranationally taken decisions that are not wholly in their interest. The two-level 
game in Community development policy thus complicates the design of a straightforward policy 
and obfuscates the direct application of aid effectiveness principles.  
The intergovernmental nature of the European Community’s ACP-aid however also 
holds opportunities for stepping up harmonisation between European donors. For example, in 
some countries the governance profile was a joint effort with each donor contributing, in some 
sort of division of labour, to the assessment on the basis of their experience and expertise in 
specific governance issues. In other situations the governance profile was fully put together by 
the EC, with the Member States only allowed to provide feedback on the EC’s work, while for ex-
ample in Burundi bilateral European donors were not even aware of the existence of the ECGIT. 
In general, the overall picture however seems to suggest that the introduction of the governance 
profile has managed to gather EU-donors around a common issue and establish a useful discus-
sion about the partner country’s governance among them.[26] In this respect the governance 
profile is a valuable and potentially powerful harmonising instrument. 
[24]   For the same reason, Member States have voiced concerns over a possible future budgetisation of the EDF 
– it limits the visibility of their aid and weakens their special relationship with the ACP states (Mackie et al. 2004). 
It would also mean giving up the special power they possess because of the intergovernmental nature of the EDF 
– budgetisation would entail a greater transparency and democratisation, but also power-sharing with the European 
Parliament (Orbie & Versluys 2008). 
[25]   Even when formal aid allocation methods are results-based, they only play a limited role, as high-level politi-
cal promises from the donor to the recipient side often intervene. 
[26]   In over forty countries, mostly located in Sub-Saharan Africa, the EC and the EU Member States jointly deliver 
more than 50 % of ODA (EC & DAC 2006). Together, the Member States and the EC are the biggest suppliers of 
ODA in the world (OECD/DAC 2007b). It is obvious that the potential is enormous: harmonisation of the EC and all 
the EU Member States present in a given country would in most ACP-countries imply that already almost half of the 
donor community is bringing their aid in line. This would immensely diminish transaction costs for highly burdened 
governments. 
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4.3.	 Incentives	and	interests	within	the	Commission
It is important to keep in mind that Member States do not negotiate about the 
ECGIT only among themselves. Another actor with a strong voice sitting at the table is the EC. 
New institutionalist theory reminds us that institutions’ own incentives and interests matter 
(Hix 2005). Of course these institutional interests are strongly tied to the above-mentioned Eu-
ropean interests. The Commission, often in alliance with some Member States, has for example 
played an important role in the sustained continuation of the ACP-EU partnership in the face of 
competing interests (e.g. the growing importance of Europe’s near neighbourhood after the end 
of the Cold War). However, the EC’s strong protection of EU interests concerning Africa is not 
solely based on European foreign policy concerns. The link between foreign policy and develop-
ment issues makes a strong European involvement in African CFSP issues also a guarantee for 
substantial aid budget (Olsen 2005). 
DG Development, like any other aid agency, has its own bureaucratic interests in 
disbursing large aid amounts to ACP nations, as the Commission naturally holds the objective 
of sustaining and enlarging its scope for action (Faust & Messner 2007). Member States how-
ever still strongly consider foreign affairs issues to be strictly intergovernmental, which means 
that the EC has always had to battle with the Council for the Europeanization of external action 
(Santiso 2002). 
Broadening the Commission’s capacity for external action can be considered part 
and parcel of this call for a broader European integration process (Holland 2002). In other words, 
development policy has become increasingly instrumental to the process of European integra-
tion as a means to “reinforce both its internal and external legitimacy” (Orbie & Versluys 2008: 
86, emphasis added). A large aid budget and strong ties with the developing world enhances 
the domestic authority of the Commission as an independent actor, apart from serving wider 
European external interests. The implementation process of the ECGIT in this way reinforces 
the Commission’s relations with African nations and thus also this institution’s legitimacy as 
an external actor apart from the Council. Clearly, support for certain policy options can thus 
be more reflective of the rivalry between institutional actors than well thought through prefer-
ences (Holland 2002, Faust and Messner 2007).  
Apart from pursuing objectives in their self-interests as organisations, aid agencies 
also battle with certain internal incentives which do not always lead to optimal policy design 
and implementation. Institutional inertia and path dependency, inherent to large bureaucra-
cies akin to the Commission, inhibit an immediate change in European policy towards the ACP 
community (Lister 1997, Holland 2002) and rather support “the persistence of an entitlement 
culture” (Santiso 2002: 408).  A negative correlation exists between specialisation (in certain 
recipients or regions) and selectivity, as donors that continue to provide aid on historical or other 
institutionally grown reasons only slightly take into account their recipients’ governance per-
formance (Easterly & Pfutze 2008).
Some other problems are related to the principal-agent issues mentioned earlier. 
Whenever recipients do not live up to the deals made, donors are not very good in handling car-
rots and sticks in appropriate ways. Partner countries promise the same reform over and over 
again to different donors, who keep disbursing aid in spite of the governments’ failure to comply 
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its part of the conditionality “contract” (Svensson 2003, Van de Walle 2005). This “push-over” 
behaviour can partly be explained by the Samaritan’s dilemma, which tricks donors into disburs-
ing because they fear that their withdrawal of aid will negatively affect those that are in dire need 
of assistance (Gibson et al. 2005). In short, donors are too soft. They honestly want to believe 
that partner countries are development maximisers and thus prefer to continue disbursements, 
just in case this time their aid will acquire the desired effect.  
The principal-agent relationship however does not only characterise donor-recipi-
ent relations, it can also explain the dynamics of the relationship between the EC and its con-
stituency. The notorious “broken feedback loop” makes it difficult for the principals (the Euro-
pean tax-payers and politicians) to know if the agent’s (EC) activities have changed the lives of 
the beneficiaries (the population of the recipient countries).[27] Given that disbursed monies are 
the most easily observable aid activities and an agencies’ budget depends on previous expendi-
tures, spending pressure pushes agencies towards disbursing aid regardless of recipients’ poli-
cies. This compromises the potential effectiveness of conditionality (Svensson 2003, Svensson 
2006, Easterly 2002, Martens 2001, Gibson et al. 2005). In the case of the EC, the relationship 
between the Member States and the EC and between the European public and the EC can be 
described as especially problematic principal-agent relationships. The EC faces a set of multiple 
principals (27 Member States) with possibly conflicting priorities (Seabright 2002) and is even 
further “separated” from the other principal, the tax-paying public, than national aid agencies. 
The result is a strong focus on budgets and other inputs. This information asymmetry between 
aid agencies and constituencies is one of the reasons why donors’ public announcements do not 
always match their real-life decisions and actions: they cater to voters through their publicly 
declared policy choices, but often implement different policies under the pressure of internal 
incentives (Jain 2007).
At the launch of the ECGIT, the EC enthusiastically communicated in several speech-
es and policy documents about the “boldness” of this instrument and the hoped turnaround it 
would expectantly cause in partner countries’ governance systems. However, since then, little 
information has been released to the general public about the progress in the actual implemen-
tation of ECGIT and the governance action plans. Many Member States have also reacted with-
out much interest to the actual implementation of the tranche because, as one EC interviewee 
claimed, “the Member States give us the money and they trust us with it, and it is very hard to 
follow this up from the capitals”. In the end, very little feedback about the ECGIT has reached 
Member States and their taxpayers. Thus on the one hand the European public is left in the dark 
about the actual allocation, use and effects of development funds, while on the other the Com-
mission’s principals can only judge the EC-dedication to ACP governance on the budget spent 
on this objective, and not on the actual effects of the ECGIT. This seems to confirm the idea “je 
dépense donc je suis” (Orbie & Versluys 2008: 78).
 
[27]   When it comes to the purpose of foreign aid, the public generally has different preferences than the govern-
ment: while politicians take into account the political and economical objectives of aid, taxpayers usually would like 
their money to be used for purely developmental purposes (Milner 2005, Jain 2007). 
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5.	 ConClusIon
With the launch of the ECGIT, the Commission seems to have fallen into the trap 
of traditional ex-ante conditionality. Although the governance profile offers promising poten-
tials in terms of harmonisation, further along the line the ECGIT does not embody crucial PD 
principles like ownership, results-orientedness or mutual accountability. It could even thwart 
the harmonisation of the policy dialogue between donors and recipients. A description of the 
complicated implementation process of the ECGIT shows that it creates quite a lot of transac-
tion costs for partner countries. Handling the political dialogue and drawing up the action plan 
are extra tasks for local officials already highly burdened with the management of aid funds. 
Taking into account the rather slim probability of the ECGIT really instigating governance reform, 
the fairly small extra aid amounts per partner country[28] and the fact that the tranche is simply 
added to partners’ global envelope, the whole implementation process resembles the opposite 
of what could be expected of new style aid. This is a somewhat surprising finding as the EC 
has repeatedly and resolutely stated its commitment to the principles of aid effectiveness. Why 
didn’t the European Community opt for a selectivity-inspired approach, which would secure a 
higher development value for European aid funds?
Finding an answer to the above question implies stepping out of the framework 
offered by the PD and looking at the whole range of donors’ rationales for giving aid. The PD 
tackles the symptoms, but not the underlying essence of the problematic aid structure (Faust 
& Messner 2007):  it supposes that implementation of the aid effectiveness principles from the 
donor side would consist of a fairly technical matter, requiring mainly an institutional and practi-
cal effort largely equivalent to a practical reorganization of aid agencies’ activities. Reforming 
aid is however not only about making some organisational or technocratic adjustments; it also 
entails tough political choices. An analysis of the political rationales and institutional interests 
that impede a full application of the aid effectiveness principles to the ECGIT illustrates that the 
spectrum of motivations and actors involved in the formulation of development policy compli-
cates the application of straightforward principles. Donors are not unitary (within one agency 
different actors play a role), unified (donors are not always on the same page) or one-dimensional 
(one donor can pursue different objectives at the same time) actors. Diverse political processes, 
actors and interests intersect the long road from lofty declarations and ambitious goal-setting 
to real-life actions and decisions. Implementing the PD and bringing about real governance re-
form thus obviously not only depends on developing countries. It also requires real donor com-
mitment, but this is unambiguously influenced by their domestic setting and the issues at stake 
there (Lancaster 2007). 
[28]   €2.7 billion, spread over more than seventy partner countries over five years.
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The case of the ECGIT confirms the argument that since the introduction of the new 
aid approach, practice has not caught up with discourse. However, a first review of the ECGIT is 
currently underway[29] and the EC will present the results to the Council in November or Decem-
ber 2008. It is to be hoped that the findings of this review will reflect into some modifications in 
the set-up and implementation of the ECGIT. 
In more general terms, it might be worth rethinking the role of Europe as a donor. 
Ideal would be that this would be placed on the agenda of Member States, civil society organisa-
tions, and European institutions. The ECGIT exemplifies that there are a lot of barriers, pitfalls 
and problems linked to the transition towards the new aid effectiveness principles because the 
latter challenge a lot of the existing institutional frameworks. The call for increasing aid budgets 
and the coming to life of additional aid sources from the new Member States will only further 
complicate the situation. “Widening” of European development policy cannot take place with-
out “deepening” and the need for a reflection process on new structures and task division is 
urgent. Budgetisation of the EDF, which would partly mitigate the reflection of Member States’ 
domestic interests in ACP cooperation, does unfortunately not seem politically feasible now. A 
first step should nevertheless be taken by moving of the aid effectiveness debate within the Eu-
ropean Union from the technocratic to the political table.
[29]  Many of the findings of the present study were confirmed in a survey conducted for the official review, which is 
being finalised at the moment. The preliminary results of this poll (presented at the Workshop on Governance in the 
10th EDF, Brussels, 30-09-2008) indicate that many stakeholders, mostly local EC delegations, do not consider the 
ECGIT conducive to ownership, harmonisation or mutual accountability and would like the ECGIT to be more based 
on ex-post evaluation, i.e. on governance performance instead of promises. The survey also brought to the light that 
partner country civil society organisations and ACP governments feel very little involved in the ECGIT process, as 
their rate of response to the survey was extremely low. 
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